Microsoft vs. Darth Jobs (aka Simmons/Kahn deathmatch): a mini-polemic

If you don't get the Darth Jobs reference, google it and enjoy.

I had a thought tonight on my drive home from work, mulling over this Hollins/Sessions business and guys like Hollinger's take on it (generally negative), and it is this - is Kahn adjusting on the fly while the status quo is, well, the status quo? 

Here's where I'm coming from: most writers, analysts, talking heads, coaches, GMs, yadda yadda yadda all come from a certain perspective - a certain school of thought or value system that informs how they not only see the world (or a given data set), but even governs what is in said world (or what the data set entails). So at its base level, Hollinger (an example I use only because I'm familiar with it) doesn't like this trade because Sessions has traditionally performed well in Hollinger's metrics, and the cap space value in return doesn't compute for Hollinger. Consider this a rhetorical example (intended to illustrate a point, not be an actual argument requiring evidence and details, etc.) 

So for a guy like Hollinger, this deal is bad, as Sessions has proved he can play well and be very productive. In fact, according to Hollinger last year, signing Sessions was a steal except for the very minor fact that he performed no where near as well with us as he did with Milwaukee the year before. Many will argue with why that was and who's fault it is, but to me the salient point is where Hollinger chooses to anchor/frame his position - Sessions was misused last year and thus has more value than we got (or in other words, the onus is on Rambis to change his system to maximize the player, and cap space is an illusory asset until realized). Is such a critique valid? Sure, and it's also ancillary to the idea I want to develop for you. 

And what is that idea? As I said before, is Kahn adjusting on the fly (learning from his mistakes and strategic miscalculations) in spite of the 'wisdom' of the status quo, and as such is vilified by and very confusing too said status quo? I don't know, but I will say that I am enjoying more and more lately the distinct possibility that Kahn is either a complete and utter fool or a modern day mad scientist. I do think that it is helpful to consider the possibility that Kahn's style might deviate from the norm, and this is why he is not accepted (recognized, even) by the norm. Not saying it makes him a good GM or a bad one, just saying that the reasons guiding what he's doing are not firmly in the status quo. Be that as it may, I will present one other analogy with which I am somewhat familiar to help (rhetorically) illustrate the distinction that I feel is important and interesting. 

Microsoft and Apple represent two vastly different approaches to technology, software, and gadgets. Microsoft usurped Apple once long ago (relatively speaking) and has held a vast monopoly/hegemony since, raking in ginormous profits and making PCs damn near ubiquitous. Apple famously ousted Steve Jobs and hired a guy from Pepsi to take over and just about killed itself in the process. When they finally came to and re-hired Steve Jobs, they embarked on a turnaround that has made them larger (in market cap, I believe) than Microsoft today.

What is useful about using these two companies as examples is how Microsoft initially demonstrated and framed how to be hugely successful in the tech market (and media), and to some extent that paradigm (or way of seeing things) still exists today: to be successful you build around core business assets (Office, XP) and core values (satisfying all legacy OS users, bundling browser to OS, engineering uber alles). In some ways, Google is emulating exactly this (although in other ways it differs significantly from Microsoft). 

Apple, however, marches to its own (perhaps dictatorial, or should I say Darth?) drummer, and to its credit has found incredible success doing so. What I am most interested in, and would focus your attention on for the purposes of this analogy, is the difference in approach between the two companies when it comes to music players and mobile phones. Apple has dominated (and in the case of the iPod essentially created) the segments of those markets  in which it competes. Microsoft has not. Why?

It's much harder to see it today given Apple's long track record with these sorts of things, but there was a time as recently as even three years ago where there was ample skepticism about Apple's ability to create, never mind sell, a mobile phone. No one up to that point had had success selling apps on phones, and no major outside tech company who wasn't already a phone maker had had good luck either. The same holds true with iPods. Many in the media and the industry were skeptical, and one of the primary reasons why is because they were coming from a paradigm not insignificantly informed by how Microsoft did its business. Incremental improvements, backwards compatibility, compatibility across damn near every single kind of (in this case) phone, meaning across different kinds of chips and hardware, and features features features! Apple's approach seemed to fly in the face of this, but as we all know now it worked.

What I want you take away from this is that Microsoft has been an extremely successful company who's way of doing business has made it a market leader for decades - and it is dire need of reinvention. It's way of doing business is still successful, but is also starting to show ominous signs looking forward 10-15 years of becoming a dinosaur. Apple nearly died a self inflicted death, but has since come back and become very successful, demonstrating a second viable approach to Microsoft's. We will see how Apple does in the future. The point is that up until recently many in the industry doubted Apple at every turn and often criticized it for being too controlling and dictatorial, and in the end they may have been right and Apple was successful anyways. It is what I am calling old school versus new school. 

So what does any of this have to do with David Kahn and basketball? For the record, I am not comparing Kahn to any luminary such as Steve Jobs, or Bill Gates, or any other bona fide genius out there. What I am suggesting is the possibility that Kahn is learning and changing tactics on the fly, and that this not only flies in the face of the established 'best practices' opinions of talking heads and various media members and analysts, this on the fly change confuses them (from their perspective it is confusing) and so they question it and criticize it and throw up their hands.

Here's what I'm thinking about (and you'll pardon me if I don't get the examples precisely right - again I'm trying to raise a rhetorical argument that offers a different perspective on Kahn's activities and suggests a different criteria against which to measure him): in trading away Sessions and Hollins for cap space (when viewed with all his other moves), Kahn has put the final nail in the coffin of being a status quo GM and is instead putting his eggs in a different basket, one that to me appears strongly influenced by adaptability and value poaching, or in other words, the Presti model (but without Durant and lots of advanced stats analysis). 

What I contend is that Kahn has realized in the year since he arrived here that many of his expectations/assumptions about rebuilding this team simply weren't true. There were no big name FAs willing to come, so our cap space 'asset' was meaningless. Most of the existing players did not play a very entertaining brand of basketball, so without wins their value to the business/marketing/apparel side of the franchise was low. The fanbase was damn near 'do not resuscitate' levels of comatosity. What I remember when he came in is that he was full of bravado, admitting that it would be difficult and take some time but also essentially guaranteeing that we would be players for a major FA this summer. Oh, how times have changed!

My intention here is not to defend or criticize his moves, or to make any judgments about whether his approach is right or wrong. When I look at Kahn's choices over the past year what I see is a nascent (and naive) basketball executive adjusting his strategy on the fly, ever looking at how best to 'game the system' and his peers. And in hindsight, what else should we have expected from a guy with his credentials? He'd been out of the NBA for years, his biggest 'street cred' was in working for Donnie Walsh a long time - on contracts and stadium deals. He'd been a writer, a D-League owner. You know who he is, right?

via www.realschluss.org

He's the guy who's always been looking in from the outside more often than not. My suspicion now more than ever is that Kahn got to where he is today by relentlessly looking and maximizing any advantage he could find - anything that put him or his company/team ahead. And yes, he's made his fair share of mistakes and miscalculations - but I would argue he's learned from them. He won't be burned by the same miscalculation twice.

He thought we'd be major players in FA, but we weren't - more than that, we couldn't be. Raw cap space wasn't an asset in and of itself, you need an attractive destination which (in this market) meant a winning team. He thought people would want to come watch this team, would enjoy seeing a winning product, and rudely discovered that not only were the wins few and far between but the product was awful to watch even when it did win. He took a chance on guys like Sessions and Hollins and found they weren't good fits (or in one case wasn't a good basketball player) and so has moved on, figuratively and literally. 

What he has found in his year here is that the most valuable currency he has are draft picks and the ability to absorb salary in trades (in addition to having the random dispensable young player or draft pick to send back to complete the trade). "We got nothing for Al Jefferson!" Maybe, maybe not. From Kahn's perspective, though, we traded an ill-fitting expensive player for cap space (asset) and draft picks (assets) and playing time for our two most promising young players (asset) while reshaping the roster and rotations to better fit the identity of the team (asset). "He passed on DMC!" Yup, he did. Why - and more importantly, was it the right thing to do? Hard to know - let's check back in 3-4 years. On the surface, though, I think it's part Tinsley (learning from a past miscalculation) and part philosophical (he wasn't convinced DMC would fit what we will be doing here, and Kahn has long since committed himself to scheme/coach than players, for better or worse). 

It's funny because while I have never thought of Kahn as Presti-like, Sam Presti is the nearest comp I can think of to describe what I think Kahn is doing, in the sense of adjusting mid-course to a strategy of poaching young talent and draft picks, operating on a very low payroll with no long term contracts, and using cap space to facilitate trades and/or poach high quality talent from other teams feeling the luxury tax bite. In a media environment where Pat Riley is hailed as being an awesome GM, well, they aren't going to recognize what Kahn is doing.

I have my own doubts about Kahn and this team, but I am excited for the team to put some results on the floor so that we can stop speculating. I personally do respect the complete overhaul of the roster Kahn has managed, and the amazing increase in length and athleticism at nearly every position across the board. I am curious to see how Kahn's embrace of scheme/coach works out, considering that we could have built around DMC and Curry. However, I'm also not convinced that either DMC or Curry will ever lead their teams to anything beyond the first round in their careers either. I do believe that Kahn is a bit skeezy and a bit predatory, but he also might be a better fit for a market such as ours because of it. We have limited options, and the debate will always exist whether or not we 'have' to take a guy like DMC, but I believe we will be better served by a guy who's always looking the advantage than by the guy who's willing to sit back and wait because, let's fact it - the only breaks we're going to get are the ones we make ourselves.